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S

Introduction

parties to the negotiating table, as in the case of Uganda, but the
greater impact of the ICC with respect to prevention will be in
its interaction with domestic systems.

ince its creation, the International Criminal Court (ICC
or Court) has been at the heart of some of the oldest and
most complex debates in international law — debates
over practical issues like enforcement and state sovereignty
and questions of ideology such as the relative values of peace
and justice. A crucial question throughout all of this has been
prevention: the ICC’s ability to end impunity and prevent future
atrocities. The Court’s supporters have consistently emphasized
its potential preventative impact and stated this as a central goal
of the Court’s activities.1

The ICC exists as a model institution, upholding the ideal
standards for prosecution of international crimes. The ICC will
undoubtedly have an impact on changing norms and the way we
think about international criminal law and accountability, simply
as a result of its existence.2 However, to single-handedly spur a
sea change in the way we react to and deal with atrocities would
be nearly impossible. The ICC only has the capacity to provide
the example, but the cooperation of other international institutions, NGOs, and most importantly States Parties to the Rome
Statute, is essential to implementing this example more broadly.
What the ICC can do is take a more active role in engaging these
groups, in particular States Parties.

These lofty goals have made it difficult for the ICC to meet
expectations, and a multitude of concerns and criticisms have
arisen over the years regarding its ability to make any meaningful contributions to prevention and, perhaps, peace. Some
argue that the Court is paralyzed by political considerations,
while others assert that political considerations actually play too
small a role. At the time of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s
indictment, many predicted that the ICC’s involvement would
actually worsen the conflict and lead to a violent backlash.
Others suggest that the threat of prosecution simply will not
deter international crimes, and that the Court will only serve to
delay and hinder peace negotiations.

Complementarity, a concept that has evolved significantly
since it was first introduced and ultimately included in the
Rome Statute,3 presents a way by which the ICC can increase
its potential positive impact on both domestic and international
criminal justice and, in the long-term, prevention. By proactively
engaging with and assisting domestic legal institutions, the ICC
will be able to strengthen the rule of law in nations suffering
from violent conflict and instability. Mass atrocities are committed when reality has been altered such that recognized moral
imperatives and norms no longer bind members of a society.
The altered reality of war and conflict creates an environment in
which crimes such as genocide are more likely to be committed
with impunity. A society that has, on the other hand, strong legal
institutions and a strong sense of the rule of law, may be less
likely to come to this brink.

The idea of justice and punishment as a deterrent to crime has
been debated and discussed throughout legal history. However,
applying the theoretical framework of this discussion to mass
atrocities is not a simple task. Mass atrocities are committed at a
time when reality is significantly altered and societal norms are
all but suspended. Whether or not the leader of a nation on the
brink of genocide may be considered a rational actor who would
take into account the risk of an ICC indictment is highly debated,
and with good reason.

The first section of this article will focus on complementarity and the emergence of the idea of positive complementarity
in recent years, and will analyze various provisions of the Rome
Statute relating to positive complementarity and the ICC’s
relationship to States Parties and other institutions. The second
section will discuss in some detail the current policy of the ICC
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and how some aspects of positive complementarity have already been implemented. Next, the
article will address the theoretical underpinnings of prevention
and how positive complementarity may play a role in deterring
future crimes by strengthening the rule of law both domestically
and internationally. Finally, the paper will conclude with a brief
discussion of the situation in Uganda and the potential impact of
positive complementarity on such a situation.

While the threat of an indictment itself may not have the
immediate deterrent effect hoped for in a domestic criminal
setting, the ICC’s preventative potential goes far beyond the
debate over deterrence. Individual prosecutions at the international level of those most responsible for atrocities are essential
to the interest of justice and have a great symbolic value for
the international community as a whole, but the ICC’s greatest contribution to prevention is not likely to arise from such
prosecutions. The prosecutions themselves may serve to bring
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By proactively engaging with and assisting domestic
legal institutions, the ICC will be able to strengthen
the rule of law in nations suffering from violent
conflict and instability.
Creating the ICC: The Rome Statute
and Complementarity

Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, have suggested that the
OTP may be able to resolve some of the current issues by interacting more closely and actively with national courts, embracing
a policy that has come to be called positive complementarity or,
occasionally, proactive complementarity.13

Both the Preamble and Article 1 of the Rome Statute note
that the jurisdiction of the ICC “shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions.”4 National courts remain the
primary venue for trying cases of mass atrocity. Only in particularly defined circumstances, enumerated in Article 17 of the
Rome Statute, are cases admissible in the ICC.

What is Positive Complementarity?
Positive complementarity is, generally, the idea that the
Court, and particularly the OTP and Chief Prosecutor, should
work to engage national jurisdictions in prosecutions, using
various methods to encourage states to prosecute cases domestically whenever possible.14 The ultimate goal of such a policy
is to strengthen domestic capacity,15 which arguably will have
a significant positive impact on prevention of future atrocities.
Positive complementarity suggests that a more active and cooperative relationship between States Parties and the ICC is crucial
to the Court’s success, particularly with respect to its long-term
preventative impact.

At its inception, the idea of complementarity was meant to
balance the competing interests of those who sought a court
with universal jurisdiction and those who placed a priority on
state sovereignty.5 A case is admissible in the ICC only when
the state with original jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”6 In all other
cases, national courts are meant to retain jurisdiction, not to be
superseded by the ICC.7
The details of complementary jurisdiction are not explicitly
described in the Rome Statute. Article 17 provides the framework for understanding complementarity, but lacks detail about
use of the concept in practice. For the ICC to obtain jurisdiction,
a state must be either unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute.8 The Appeals Chamber has held that, when
determining admissibility, the Court must first look to whether
there are ongoing investigations or trials, or whether the state
conducted such investigations in the past.9 Only if one or both of
these things have occurred does the Court then look to questions
of unwillingness or inability.10 If the state with jurisdiction over
an alleged crime has not attempted to conduct an investigation
or trial, the case is deemed admissible without consideration of
willingness or ability.11

Where traditional complementarity was meant to protect state
sovereignty and was built on the idea that states would carry out
national prosecutions as a result of the threat of international
intervention by the ICC, positive complementarity envisions a
more cooperative relationship between national jurisdictions and
the Court.16 While this might mean, most simply, a more proactive “carrot-and-stick” approach, it could also mean that the ICC
would act to “enhance the ability of states to undertake genuine
investigations and prosecutions.”17 This activity could encompass anything from communicating with states in which atrocities may be occurring to establishing “legal and judicial training
and cooperation mechanisms to bolster a weak justice system,
and then monitor[ing] local judicial processes undertaken for
crimes that would otherwise fall under ICC jurisdiction.”18

Courtesy of the ICC.

Evolution of the ICC and
Positive Complementarity

ICC Prosecutor Luis
Moreno Ocampo.

Approaches to Positive Complementarity

At its inception, the ICC was saddled with a number of tasks and by the
time the Rome Statute went into force
in 2002, expectations for the impact the
ICC might have on the international community and rule of law were exceptionally
high.12 As the Court has navigated early
investigations and cases, the challenges
to fulfilling these lofty expectations have
become increasingly clear. To address a
number of concerns, members of the international community, including at times

The “carrot-and-stick” approach is most similar to the original conception of complementarity, based on the idea that the
threat of ICC intervention will motivate states to conduct their
own national level prosecutions. The difference with respect to
positive complementarity is that the OTP would engage more
directly with States Parties, using diplomatic and other public
channels to express concern about a particular situation, thus
encouraging the state to take action.19 This is likely to be most
effective in cases of states that are unwilling, rather than unable,
to prosecute. Opening the channels of communication and
22
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ICC Member States as of July 2009.

engaging in dialogue with the state regarding the situation could
spur the state to act.20

sible; relies on national and international networks; and participates in a system of international cooperation.”26 In a positive
complementarity model, the Court communicates openly with
states regarding situations of concern and works to assist those
states in strengthening their judicial systems in order to carry out
domestic prosecutions. The OTP recognizes in this paper that the
support of States Parties as well as “international networks” will
be crucial to the success of such an approach.

Positive complementarity may mean, in certain circumstances, working to actively enhance a state’s ability to carry
out investigations and prosecutions that meet international
standards.21 This type of approach may be most useful in cases
in which a state is willing but unable to prosecute. This method
is likely to be resource-intensive, and given the ICC’s limited
resources, the OTP will need to look to other States Parties and
international organizations for assistance. The ICC and the OTP
could in fact be instrumental in establishing and strengthening
a transnational network geared towards enforcement of international criminal law.22

Part of the OTP’s approach to positive complementarity is the
policy of soliciting self-referrals.27 In a self-referral case,
the Court and a territorial state incapacitated by mass
crimes may agree that a consensual division of labour
is the most logical and effective approach. Groups bitterly divided by conflict may oppose prosecutions at
each others’ hands and yet agree to a prosecution by a
Court perceived as neutral and impartial.28

Positive Complementarity and the OTP
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has recognized the
importance of complementary domestic prosecution, saying,
“[A]s a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases
that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency.
On the contrary, an absence of trials before this Court, as a
consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions,
would be a major success.”23 A 2003 OTP Policy Paper on
complementarity describes the general rule of complementarity
as “tak[ing] action only where there is a clear case of failure to
take national action.” The paper goes on to note that “a major
part of the external relations and outreach strategy of the Office
of the Prosecutor will be to encourage and facilitate States
to carry out their primary responsibility of investigating and
prosecuting crimes.”24 This indicates that the OTP began early
on to develop the idea of what has since been deemed positive
complementarity.25

While the drafters of the Rome Statute likely did not envision
such a policy, self-referrals present an important tool by which
to create a partnership between the Court and States Parties, as
opposed to a competitive relationship.

The Role of Outside Institutions
Two main challenges the ICC faces at this point are a lack
of resources and a lack of credibility, both of which are concerns that may be overcome with the aid of outside institutions.
Positive complementarity urges the ICC to act in concert with
States Parties; in order to provide the necessary resources and
support, the Court will need to work closely with international
institutions and organizations as well as gain the cooperation of
States Parties.

In its 2006 Policy Paper on Prosecutorial Strategy, the OTP
notes that it will take a positive approach to complementarity. The paper defines such an approach as meaning that the
OTP “encourages genuine national proceedings where pos-

The arena of international criminal law remains a developing field,29 and the participation of States Parties is crucial to
its evolution. As commentators have noted, “Where a state acts
in such a situation of legal vulnerability its dual role as subject
23
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and creator of international law becomes most visible. As such,
states in transition apply existing law and, in so doing, contribute
to its refinement.”30 States are more likely to rely on and follow
the ICC if it is viewed not as an institution operating on its own,
but as a part of the international community that supports a body
of accepted international norms.

credibility concern relates to the fact that trials in international
courts and tribunals have been criticized as being too farremoved from the conflict itself, both geographically and ideologically. States have different approaches to justice, and some
critics of the ICC note that it may not be able to take into account
such differences, weakening its credibility in their eyes and the
eyes of both perpetrators and victims in some states.36

Lack of Resources

On an immediate level, national courts are in many ways
the most efficient and effective venue for trying cases of mass
atrocity that have occurred within a state’s territory. The benefits
range from practical — access to evidence and witnesses — to
more abstract — trying perpetrators in the affected state may
be a more effective transitional justice method, as the trials are
closer to the victims and others affected by the crimes in question, thus providing a greater connection for states and citizens
working towards peace and reconciliation.37 Adopting a positive
approach to complementarity and thus encouraging domestic trials could undercut the criticism that the Court is too far-removed
for effective prosecution and prevention.

With respect to positive complementarity, the more ambitious
goal of actually assisting domestic systems with capacity building seems to only exacerbate the problem of lack of resources.31
In order to truly make progress with respect to positive complementarity, the ICC, and at this stage specifically the OTP, must
seek assistance and support from States Parties as well as NGOs
and the international community. As mentioned above, the ICC
could serve to facilitate a transnational network of organizations
working in the area of international criminal law. Dozens of
NGOs focus on rule of law and transitional justice. By working
in coordination with such groups, the ICC can help NGOs to
focus their work where it is most needed and draw international
attention to conflicts that might otherwise be overlooked. This
will draw resources and support to situations that need attention
but which the ICC may not be able to address without assistance.

Positive Complementarity and Prevention
By encouraging national courts to establish systems by
which to try international crimes as defined in the Rome Statute,
the ICC is making an essential contribution to the prevention of
atrocities. Positive complementarity encourages states to build
and strengthen their domestic judicial systems. A state with
strong judicial institutions and respect for the rule of law is arguably less likely to reach the level of societal upheaval in which
international crimes are most often committed.

The OTP has already indicated that it recognizes the value
of relationships with outside institutions. The 2006 Report
on Prosecutorial Strategy notes that “the Office will continue
expanding its network of contacts with non-States Parties,
international organisations and NGOs aimed at fostering a supportive environment.” The report also mentions solidifying the
Court’s relationship with the UN and crafting a specific plan of
outreach to regional organizations such as the European Union
and the African Union.32 The 2006 Report on Prosecutorial
Strategy lists as its Fifth Objective the goal of establishing
“forms of cooperation with states and organizations to maximize
the Office’s contribution to the fight against impunity and the
prevention of crimes.”33

Deterrence and Prevention in an International Setting
The concept of prevention in the context of mass atrocities is
necessarily different from the idea of deterrence in a domestic
setting. The value of punishment as a deterrent is debated even
at the national level, with frequent disagreement over issues
such as whether certainty or severity of punishment has a greater
impact on deterrence.38 When applying this type of theory
to international crimes such as genocide and crimes against
humanity, one must also take into account the specific situations
in which such crimes occur.

Cooperation with other institutions will be crucial to the
ICC’s success, particularly with respect to resource-intensive
assistance to national judicial systems. By engaging States
Parties through positive complementarity, the OTP may expect
and encourage states to draw upon their own resources and
those of supporting NGOs in the region in order to comply with
international standards and OTP requests and suggestions. The
support of NGOs and other institutions will not only provide
additional resources, but may also lend much-needed credibility
to the ICC’s and the OTP’s actions.34 It is from NGOs and States
Parties that the Prosecutor will receive the support necessary
to legitimate his actions and thus enhance the credibility of the
Court.35

Mass atrocities occur at times when normal societal order has
broken down: as one scholar writes, “[C]ivil conflict is, by definition, coterminous with the collapse of public order.”39 Given
that the norms of daily life have all but disappeared in such situations, the arguments for deterrence with respect to individual
crimes such as theft or even murder necessarily shift.
Traditional notions of deterrence are based on the idea that
the prospect of punishment will prevent an individual from
taking unlawful action. Deterrence theory falls into two categories: general and specific deterrence, with specific deterrence
focusing on the individual and general deterrence on preventing
crime in society at large.40 A main criticism of the ICC is that
the assumption that potential perpetrators involved in an armed
conflict are weighing the consequences of their actions and may
be deterred by the threat of prosecution seems less than likely.
In other words, “the assumption of perpetrator rationality in the

Credibility and National Prosecutions
A consistent criticism of the ICC is a lack of credibility
stemming from multiple issues. As noted above, one approach
to addressing some of this criticism is to enlist the support of
States Parties and other institutions in order to more concretely
establish both the place of the ICC in international law, as well
as enforcement of international criminal law in general. Another
24
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chaos of massive violence, incendiary propaganda, and upended
social order” is something of a leap.41

By adopting a strategy of positive complementarity and
using both increased pressure and communication between the
ICC and States Parties, as well as facilitating ICC-supported
transnational networks dedicated to international criminal law,
the OTP together with the ICC as a whole can foster greater
respect for the rule of law both domestically and internationally. Strong judicial institutions will stabilize societies, fostering
respect for both judicial and governmental structures, which
may strengthen a democratic form of government. This in turn
will reduce the likelihood that such atrocities will occur down
the road, as it is arguably less likely that society will again reach
such a point of collapse. As Diane Orentlicher notes, “[B]y demonstrating that no sector is above the law, prosecutions of state
crimes can foster respect for democratic institutions and thereby
deepen a society’s democratic culture.”42

Courtesy of USAID.

While individual prosecutions are not without merit since
they may in certain cases (such as Uganda) spur negotiations
and serve as an important tool for establishing much-needed
precedent, the ICC may have the greatest ability to prevent on
a larger scale through its impact on national judicial systems.

New arrivals at a camp for internally displaced persons in northern
Uganda.

The Example of Uganda
The ICC is only in its early stages of operation, and the emergence of positive complementarity as a policy choice for the
OTP is younger still. Given the short time the policy has been in
place, it is difficult to measure its effectiveness. It will be nearly
impossible to determine when an atrocity has been prevented,
as there will be little evidence of an event that has not occurred.
The case of Uganda, however, provides an example of early
benefits associated with a positive complementarity approach.

Experts suggest there are “conditions precedent to mass violence” such as “the silence of the majority, the acquiescence of
the bystander, and the complicity of those neighbors who avert
their gaze.”43 By working with various international bodies —
from the UN to NGOs to other States Parties — the OTP and
the ICC as a whole may be able to make these conditions more
and more difficult to create. Drawing international attention to
a situation could inspire neighboring states to apply diplomatic
pressure or encourage individuals to speak up about certain violations that they might otherwise have ignored.

In December 2003, Ugandan President Museveni requested
that the ICC investigate and prosecute the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) for serious violations of international law, and
in January 2004, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo officially
opened an investigation in the region.46 The LRA had been operating in northern Uganda since the late 1980s. Led by Joseph
Kony, the rebel group originally claimed to be fighting for greater
political power for northern Uganda and generally in protest of
the government’s alleged ill-treatment of northern Ugandans.
The LRA has also claimed religious motivations, including the
goal of implementing as law the Ten Commandments. In the
early 1990s, the LRA began to focus their attacks on civilians
in northern Uganda in order to eliminate those who supposedly
supported the government over the LRA.47

Were the OTP to implement a policy of positive complementarity, thus engaging with states and drawing the attention
of both States Parties and outside organizations to specific
situations and crises, this could actually “turn some erstwhile
bystanders into gatekeepers.”44 These bystanders may act to prevent atrocity not because they themselves fear prosecution, but
because of a moral imperative to act. In the long term, this urge
could be strengthened if the ICC were to support and pressure
States Parties to follow through with prevention and prosecution
of grave international crimes, helping to create stronger institutions and in the long run strengthening the rule of law.

After years of failed peace negotiations,48 President Museveni
referred the case to the ICC in 2004. This was the first situation
of self-referral to the Court,49 representing an early success of
the Prosecutor’s policy encouraging self-referrals in lieu of using
his proprio motu powers.50 Article 15 of the Rome Statute gives
the Prosecutor the power to “initiate investigations proprio motu
on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court.” Thus, proprio motu powers allow the Prosecutor to
act on his own volition, as opposed to waiting for a State Party
or the Security Council to refer a situation to the Court.51

Thus, the ICC’s greatest contribution may not be an individual prosecution:
[T]he critical moment may not come when the Court
first begins to investigate and pursue charges. Instead,
it may come later, after which the ICC’s work may
already have helped to stigmatize the wrongdoers,
draw international attention to a difficult situation, and
catalyze increased political pressure that is conducive
to negotiation.45

Throughout the peace process, observers have suggested that
ICC involvement has served to bring the LRA to the negotiating
table when the rebel group might not otherwise have done so.52
The positive involvement and encouragement of the ICC has
thus contributed to the progress of difficult peace negotiations.
Although a peace agreement has yet to be signed, the violence
has decreased in Northern Uganda since the ICC referral.53

This in turn could spur the state to act, to seek assistance
from organizations working on rule of law issues, and to
work closely with an ICC that embraces the notion of positive
complementarity.
25

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4
As a result of ICC involvement and demands from LRA
leaders in negotiations that they not be prosecuted abroad, the
Government of Uganda has begun to implement a method by
which to try domestically the international crimes enumerated in
the Rome Statute.54 The process thus far has engaged a significant number of government and civil society leaders. Based on
the involvement of these leaders as well as concerted outreach
efforts within the local legal communities and particularly with
leaders in Gulu, the creation of these institutions may contribute
to greater respect for the institution and trials that result. The
envisioned war crimes division of the Ugandan High Court will
be the product of a collaborative process between local leaders
and international advisors, and ideally will reflect both Ugandan
and international standards and incorporate traditional justice
mechanisms. Indeed, Uganda is so highly engaged with the process that Kampala was selected to be the site of the ICC Review
Conference from May to June 2010.55

interest in rule of law that its establishment inspires may be the
first step toward a more stable judicial system, and ultimately,
a more stable government in a country that has struggled with
violence, corruption, and instability since independence.

Conclusion
Prevention of atrocities is a simultaneously much debated and
highly championed part of the ICC’s mandate. Not only is prevention a debated issue, it also proves nearly impossible to measure. While the Court’s existence and operation will serve as an
example and help to create necessary standards in the developing
field of international criminal law, perhaps the most direct contribution it can make towards prevention is through engagement
with States Parties to strengthen domestic judicial institutions.
Article 17 of the Rome Statute allows the ICC, and the OTP
in particular, the flexibility necessary to adopt a policy of positive complementarity, working to encourage and support states to
pursue domestic prosecutions. States Parties may take ownership
of the process and tailor it to the needs of a particular situation,
which in the long run may lead to a more lasting peace and
stronger rule of law.

The full impact these activities will have on Uganda in the
future remains to be seen. The OTP’s policy of active engagement with States Parties and the new approach of positive
complementarity seem to have played a role in moving Uganda
forward in its peace process, and in both expanding the judicial
system and engaging various parts of society in the process. If
the war crimes division does succeed, it will likely face many
challenges and criticisms, but the fact of its existence will be a
positive development, much like the existence of the ICC, and
the new division’s existence over time may strengthen respect for
the rule of law in Uganda.

By working with states to strengthen their domestic institutions, the ICC can foster respect for the rule of law and governmental institutions, creating a more stable society which in
turn would be less likely to fall into mass violence in the future.
Through cooperation with other institutions and NGOs, the ICC
may be able to provide the support necessary to states seeking
assistance. While individual prosecutions are valuable in what
they represent, and the model they set forth, the long-term impact
of the ICC on prevention will likely be seen most clearly in its
interaction with domestic jurisdictions.		
HRB

The emerging field of international criminal law remains in
its nascent stages. States such as Uganda and institutions such as
the ICC have the potential to move the field forward and further
clarify and establish both domestic and international norms and
standards. Uganda’s war crimes division and the discussions and
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